The ability to predict when societies will replace one social norm for another can have significant implications for welfare, especially when norms are detrimental. A popular theory poses that the pressure to conform to social norms creates tipping thresholds which, once passed, propel societies toward an alternative state. Predicting when societies will reach a tipping threshold, however, has been a major challenge because of the lack of experimental data for evaluating competing models. We present evidence from a large-scale laboratory experiment designed to test the theoretical predictions of a threshold model for social tipping and norm change. In our setting, societal preferences change gradually, forcing individuals to weigh the benefit from deviating from the norm against the cost from not conforming to the behavior of others. We show that the model correctly predicts in 96% of instances when a society will succeed or fail to abandon a detrimental norm. Strikingly, we observe widespread persistence of detrimental norms even when individuals determine the cost for nonconformity themselves as they set the latter too high. Interventions that facilitate a common understanding of the benefits from change help most societies abandon detrimental norms. We also show that instigators of change tend to be more risk tolerant and to dislike conformity more. Our findings demonstrate the value of threshold models for understanding social tipping in a broad range of social settings and for designing policies to promote welfare.

Research on incarceration has focused on prisons, but jail detention is far more common than imprisonment. Jails are local institutions that detain people before trial or incarcerate them for short sentences for low-level offenses. Research from the 1970s and 1980s viewed jails as “managing the rabble,” a small and deeply disadvantaged segment of urban populations that struggled with problems of addiction, mental illness, and homelessness. The 1990s and 2000s marked a period of mass criminalization in which new styles of policing and court processing produced large numbers of criminal cases for minor crimes, concentrated in low-income communities of color. In a period of widespread criminal justice contact for minor offenses, how common is jail incarceration for minority men, particularly in poor neighborhoods? We estimate cumulative risks of jail incarceration with an administrative data file that records all jail admissions and discharges in New York City from 2008 to 2017. Although New York has a low jail incarceration rate, we find that 26.8% of Black men and 16.2% of Latino men, in contrast to only 3% of White men, in New York have been jailed by age 38 y. We also find evidence of high rates of repeated incarceration among Black men and high incarceration risks in high-poverty neighborhoods. Despite the jail’s great reach in New York, we also find that the incarcerated population declined in the study period, producing a large reduction in the prevalence of jail incarceration for Black and Latino men.

We introduce a method for making short-term mortality forecasts of a few months, illustrating it by estimating how many deaths might have happened if some major shock had not occurred. We apply the method to assess excess mortality from March to June 2020 in Denmark and Sweden as a result of the first wave of the coronavirus pandemic; associated policy interventions; and behavioral, healthcare, social, and economic changes. We chose to compare Denmark and Sweden because reliable data were available and because the two countries are similar but chose different responses to COVID-19: Denmark imposed a rather severe lockdown; Sweden did not. We make forecasts by age and sex to predict expected deaths if COVID-19 had not struck. Subtracting these forecasts from observed deaths gives the excess death count. Excess deaths were lower in Denmark than Sweden during the first wave of the pandemic. The later/earlier ratio we propose for shortcasting is easy to understand, requires less data than more elaborate approaches, and may be useful in many countries in making both predictions about the future and the past to study the impact on mortality of coronavirus and other epidemics. In the application to Denmark and Sweden, prediction intervals are narrower and bias is less than when forecasts are based on averages of the last 5 y, as is often done. More generally, later/earlier ratios may prove useful in short-term forecasting of illnesses and births as well as economic and other activity that varies seasonally or periodically.

Although there is increasing awareness of disparities in COVID-19 infection risk among vulnerable communities, the effect of behavioral interventions at the scale of individual neighborhoods has not been fully studied. We develop a method to quantify neighborhood activity behaviors at high spatial and temporal resolutions and test whether, and to what extent, behavioral responses to social-distancing policies vary with socioeconomic and demographic characteristics. We define exposure density (Exρ

Crises lay bare the social fault lines of society. In the United States, race, gender, age, and education have affected vulnerability to COVID-19 infection. Yet, consequences likely extend far beyond morbidity and mortality. Temporarily closing the economy sent shock waves through communities, raising the possibility that social inequities, preexisting and current, have weakened economic resiliency and reinforced disadvantage, especially among groups most devastated by the Great Recession. We address pandemic precarity, or risk for material and financial insecurity, in Indiana, where manufacturing loss is high, metro areas ranked among the hardest hit by the Great Recession nationally, and health indicators stand in the bottom quintile. Using longitudinal data (n = 994) from the Person to Person Health Interview Study, fielded in 2019–2020 and again during Indiana’s initial stay-at-home order, we provide a representative, probability-based assessment of adverse economic outcomes of the pandemic. Survey-weighted multivariate regressions, controlling for preexisting inequality, find Black adults over 3 times as likely as Whites to report food insecurity, being laid off, or being unemployed. Residents without a college degree are twice as likely to report food insecurity (compared to some college), while those not completing high school (compared to bachelor’s degree) are 4 times as likely to do so. Younger adults and women were also more likely to report economic hardships. Together, the results support contentions of a Matthew Effect, where pandemic precarity disproportionately affects historically disadvantaged groups, widening inequality. Strategically deployed relief efforts and longer-term policy reforms are needed to challenge the perennial and unequal impact of disasters.

Human capital, broadly defined as the skills acquired through formal education, is acknowledged as one of the key drivers of economic growth and social development. However, its measurement for the working-age populations, on a global scale and over time, is still unsatisfactory. Most indicators either only consider the quantity dimension of education and disregard the actual skills or are demographically inconsistent by applying the skills of the young cohorts in school to represent the skills of the working-age population at the same time. In the case of rapidly expanding or changing school systems, this assumption is untenable. However, an increasing number of countries have started to assess the literacy skills of their adult populations by age and sex directly. Drawing on this literacy data, and by using demographic backprojection and statistical estimation techniques, we here present a demographically consistent indicator for adult literacy skills, the skills in literacy adjusted mean years of schooling (SLAMYS). The measure is given for the population aged 20 to 64 in 185 countries and for the period 1970 to 2015. Compared to the conventional mean years of schooling (MYS)—which has strongly increased for most countries over the past decades, and in particular among poor countries—the trends in SLAMYS exhibit a widening global skills gap between low- and high-performing countries.

Attempts to find central “influencers,” “opinion leaders,” “hubs,” “optimal seeds,” or other important people who can hasten or slow diffusion or social contagion has long been a major research question in network science. We demonstrate that opinion leadership occurs only under conventional but implausible scope conditions. We demonstrate that a highly central node is a more effective seed for diffusion than a random node if nodes can only learn via the network. However, actors are also subject to external influences such as mass media and advertising. We find that diffusion is noticeably faster when it begins with a high centrality node, but that this advantage only occurs in the region of parameter space where external influence is constrained to zero and collapses catastrophically even at minimal levels of external influence. Importantly, nearly all prior agent-based research on choosing a seed or seeds implicitly occurs in the network influence only region of parameter space. We demonstrate this effect using preferential attachment, small world, and several empirical networks. These networks vary in how large the baseline opinion leadership effect is, but in all of them it collapses with the introduction of external influence. This implies that, in marketing and public health, advertising broadly may be underrated as a strategy for promoting network-based diffusion.

Hearing the voice of God, feeling the presence of the dead, being possessed by a demonic spirit—such events are among the most remarkable human sensory experiences. They change lives and in turn shape history. Why do some people report experiencing such events while others do not? We argue that experiences of spiritual presence are facilitated by cultural models that represent the mind as “porous,” or permeable to the world, and by an immersive orientation toward inner life that allows a person to become “absorbed” in experiences. In four studies with over 2,000 participants from many religious traditions in the United States, Ghana, Thailand, China, and Vanuatu, porosity and absorption played distinct roles in determining which people, in which cultural settings, were most likely to report vivid sensory experiences of what they took to be gods and spirits.

Surveillance is critical in containing globally increasing antimicrobial resistance (AMR). Affordable methodologies to prioritize AMR surveillance efforts are urgently needed, especially in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs), where resources are limited. While socioeconomic characteristics correlate with clinical AMR prevalence, this correlation has not yet been used to estimate AMR prevalence in countries lacking surveillance. We captured the statistical relationship between AMR prevalence and socioeconomic characteristics in a suite of beta-binomial principal component regression models for nine pathogens resistant to 19 (classes of) antibiotics. Prevalence data from ResistanceMap were combined with socioeconomic profiles constructed from 5,595 World Bank indicators. Cross-validated models were used to estimate clinical AMR prevalence and temporal trends for countries lacking data. Our approach provides robust estimates of clinical AMR prevalence in LMICs for most priority pathogens (cross-validated q² > 0.78 for six out of nine pathogens). By supplementing surveillance data, 87% of all countries worldwide, which represent 99% of the global population, are now informed. Depending on priority pathogen, our estimates benefit 2.1 to 4.9 billion people living in countries with currently insufficient diagnostic capacity. By estimating AMR prevalence worldwide, our approach allows for a data-driven prioritization of surveillance efforts. For carbapenem-resistant Acinetobacter baumannii and third-generation cephalosporin-resistant Escherichia coli, specific countries of interest are located in the Middle East, based on the magnitude of estimates; sub-Saharan Africa, based on the relative prevalence increase over 1998 to 2017; and the Pacific Islands, based on improving overall model coverage and performance.

Effective states govern by some combination of enforcement and voluntary compliance. To contain the COVID-19 pandemic, a critical decision is the extent to which policy makers rely on voluntary as opposed to enforced compliance, and nations vary along this dimension. While enforcement may secure higher compliance, there is experimental and other evidence that it may also crowd out voluntary motivation. How does enforcement affect citizens’ support for anti–COVID-19 policies? A survey conducted with 4,799 respondents toward the end of the first lockdown in Germany suggests that a substantial share of the population will support measures more under voluntary than under enforced implementation. Negative responses to enforcement—termed control aversion—vary across the nature of the policy intervention (e.g., they are rare for masks and frequent for vaccination and a cell-phone tracing app). Control aversion is less common among those with greater trust in the government and the information it provides, and among those who were brought up under the coercive regime of East Germany. Taking account of the likely effectiveness of enforcement and the extent to which near-universal compliance is crucial, the differing degrees of opposition to enforcement across policies suggest that for some anti–COVID-19 policies an enforced mandate would be unwise, while for others it would be essential. Similar reasoning may also be relevant for policies to address future pandemics and other societal challenges like climate change.